This is the the thirtieth post in my Theories of Knowledge and Reality series. Follow the link for more on the series and for links to other entries as they appear. In the last post, I began responding to the first two of five questions about particular kinds of evil or ways of evil that come up in the evidential problem of evil. This post contains the main responses to the third and fourth questions.
C. Even if God would not restore things immediately, wouldn’t a good God prevent innocent beings from experiencing the consequences of that evil?
Similar things can be said here as with the previous question. The only way to prevent the consequences of evil completely is to prevent the innocent people from even discovering what happened. But that would mean no one would know when anyone else does anything wrong unless they deserve the negative consequences. In effect, this would be a virtual reality for each person in which no one else ever experiences the effects of their actions, but the person doing the evil action experiences things as if the other people did. There are three reasons why we should not expect a good God to do this.