Which Supreme Court Justice Are You?

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Most tests I find to determine how closely one might align with which Supreme Court justices are fairly superficial and don't base their calculation on very many issues. They also usually focus on general issues that don't always line up well with the actual cases that we have justices' votes on. I've found one that's a lot better, although it does have a few problems still. This one is mainly focused on actual cases, although its reliance on mostly hot-button political issues, while providing some familiarity for those who aren't heavy court-watchers, probably skews the results, whereas one that included more mundane issues might lead some to side with justices whose views they disagree with on hot-button political issues.

I have a few comments on the test before I get to my results and question-by-question analysis and explanations. This quiz gets most of the issues right and in some places makes finer distinctions between views than most. As far as I can tell, almost all of the questions (with one exception I can detect) are based on actual votes of justices rather than expected views or general tendencies. I do see two problems, though, and they are substantial.

One is that it does still oversimplify in a few places. It seems to ask questions about the result, which fails to capture the various reasons justices might go for that result. Thus an originalist who supports originalist reasons for a certain result might be on the same side as a non-originalist who picks the same side for living constitutionalist reasons. Someone indicating that choice then gets both names associated with them, and that's unfortunate. I found a lot of these cases put me on the same side as justices whose reasoning I don't support. Most people aren't going to read the cases or even summaries of them, either, and thus they will be going fully on policy preferences. Some justices do that anyway unashamedly, and sometimes the ones who seek not to do that will smuggle policy preferences in without admitting it. But if I want to see if I'm like a certain justice, I should see if I agree with the justice's reasoning, not whether the outcome is the one I'd prefer if I were in a legislative body. Making this quiz result-based masks the real differences between the justices, treats policy outcomes as the only issue of dispute, and thus skews the results.

Some of the questions themselves are not framed correctly at all. For instance, on #10 it asks if suspected terrorists who aren't U.S. citizens have any constitutional rights, and everyone on the Supreme Court would say yes to that. But that issue has never been before the Court. So what's it doing here? What they probably meant to ask is whether they have some specified set of rights (e.g. habeas corpus and related rights to use U.S. courts to challenge their imprisonment, which the Supreme Court did disagree on). On several questions, I thought the question asked about a more minor matter of disagreement than what the main dispute in the case was about. In a few cases, I thought the opinions were so splintered that it wasn't really a good case to ask such a broad question about, as if your view on the issue of the question would tell you much about how much your reasoning or preferences are like those of any particular justices.

But, all that being said, this is still one of the better tests matching your answers to legal questions with justices who voted on those cases, so I thought it was worth spending some time seeing where I really come out, and I decided to look at some of these cases I was less familiar with in more detail to try to overcome some of the problems in how the questionnaire is conducted. Now on to my results and analysis.


This is in terms of what percentage of the questions I agree with each justice:

Justice Clarence Thomas 89%
Chief Justice John Roberts 83%
Justice Samuel Alito 82%
Justice Antonin Scalia 79%
Justice Anthony Kennedy 54%
Justice Stephen Breyer 27%
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 27%
Justice John Paul Stevens 26%
Justice David Souter 26%

Much of this isn't a big surprise to me. I tend to be judicially conservative, and I don't place as much stock in precedent as Justice Scalia, the biggest distinction between him and Justice Thomas. It's interesting that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are closer to me than Justice Scalia. I'm not sure why that is. But I think it shows that my views on these kinds of questions don't really fall along the conservative-liberal spectrum in any exact way, because Scalia would fall between Roberts and Alito. (And by the reasoning in this post, I'm not a libertarian either, because then I'd have Roberts and Alito both higher than both Scalia and Thomas.)

Kennedy votes for what he sees as just but has inclinations in both directions politically, so it's unsurprising that I agree with about half of his views out of this set.

I'm surprised how close the other four are to each other, but that may be an artifact of the hot-button nature of the cases and issues chosen for this quiz. Most of these cases were 5-4 with Kennedy or O'Connor as the deciding vote or 6-3 with Kennedy and O'Connor in the majority. Justices Souter and Ginsburg are actually judicially conservative when no political issue of major consequence is at stake, generally favoring narrower decisions that aren't wide-ranging and sticking very closely to the text of the laws in question, and Breyer tries more often than the other three to find middle ground with the conservatives by compromising halfway even on politically-loaded questions, so I suspect there would be more differences if they had different kinds of cases and issues.

1. Abortion is a Constitutionally protected right. True or False?

Cases: Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey

My answer: False. My position is actually more conservative than even the Roe v. Wade dissenters, since I lean toward thinking the 14th Amendment not only doesn't require legalized abortion but actually prohibits it. I'm with Rehnquist, Scalia, White, and Thomas on Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Only Scalia and Thomas remain on the Court from those who opposed that decision, and no one remains from the Roe v. Wade dissent.

justices counted as agreeing with me: Scalia, Thomas
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Stevens, Kennedy, Souter

I wish they included former justices on the cases they include, but they don't.

2. The federal government may ban partial birth abortions. True or False?

Cases: Stenberg v. Carhart and Gonzales v. Carhart

True. I fully support the majority decision by Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Alito. The issue had been ruled on before by the Rehnquist Court. In that decision, I agree with Justice Thomas' dissent more than the other opinions. I'm undecided on which side is correct in the debate between Scalia and Kennedy/Rehnquist's dissents. (The issue is whether Planned Parenthood v. Casey's undue burden standard requires disallowing this ban, and it hinges on the vagueness of what it means to be an undue burden. Thomas' opinion ignores that issue, because it's not relevant to the constitutionality issue due to its being an artificial construction of the Supreme Court.)

justices counted as agreeing with me: Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Alito
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

3.  A state may make one of its public universities men-only. True or False?

Case: United States v. Virginia

True, but this case isn't one of the ones where they may do so, and no one is going to go to the effort to satisfy the requirements I would have for separate sex-segregated public universities of equal quality both in education and reputation. I support Rehnquist's partial concurrence, not the full O'Connor plurality opinion and not the Souter partial concurrence. They agreed on the results but not on the reasons why. So I'm going to say False, because in this case I would have sided with those who said that, even if I disagree with the reasons of everyone in the majority except Rehnquist.

justices counted as agreeing with me: Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Scalia
justices who should count as agreeing with me: none who remain on the Court

4. A state is allowed to impose a life sentence without the possiblity of parole for someone convicted of possessing large amounts of cocaine. True or False?

Case: Harmelin v. Michigan

True. I also think I favor the Scalia/Rehnquist concurrence over the Kennedy/O'Connor/Souter plurality. I don't think the 8th Amendment requires the punishment to be proportional.

justices counted as agreeing with me: Scalia, Kennedy, Souter
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Stevens
justices who should count as agreeing with me: Scalia

5. A state may enact a law that makes cross burning (no matter what the reason) a crime. True or False?

Case: Virginia v. Black

True. Most of the debate on this issue wasn't over that question, though. Souter/Kennedy/Ginsburg thought cross-burning should always count as free speech, and Thomas said it's an act and not speech but its associations with terrorism except it from free speech protection, no matter the motivation. All the other justices thought it could be prohibited but only when there's an intent to intimidate. But there was a big squabble between two factions, led by O'Connor and Scalia, over whether this particular law was ok. O'Connor thought not, and Scalia thought it was fine. So this question basically asks if you hold Thomas' view or the view of the rest of them that sometimes cross-burning is constitutionally-protected free speech.

I don't think it's protected in as many cases as any of the justices who took it to be sometimes protected, but I do think it should be protected in some cases (e.g. you're making a movie about the KKK, and you burn a cross to depict KKK acts in the film). I think Thomas is right about most cases, though, but I don't think his reasons are right. It's not that cross-burning is always unconstitutional because it is associated with terrorism in people's minds. It's that what it communicates in most cases isn't an idea to be debated but is more like fighting words, which the Supreme Court has counted as an exception for about a century now. So I've got a position that doesn't go as far as Thomas' in one respect and has different reasons motivating it, but I technically answer the question above the way all the
other justices would. So this is a very deceptive question.

justices counted as agreeing with me: Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, Breyer
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg
justices who should count as agreeing with me: On the issues the majority/plurality/concurrence disagreed on, I'm closest to Scalia. But it's hard to say if I'm really closer to Scalia or Thomas on this. I don't think you need to show intent to intimidate, but I also don't think the action itself is always an exception to free speech protection. Sometimes it's part of an act of free expression. So the answer is probably that I agree with none of them on this question.

6. May a private organization, like the Boy Scouts, exclude someone from membership solely because of their sexual orientation?

Case: Boy Scouts of America v. Dale

Yes, I do tend to think the First Amendment right to assembly peaceably includes the right to form private groups that discriminate, so laws like New Jersey's that criminalize such discrimination.

justices counted as agreeing with me: Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

7. Should states be permitted to sentence juveniles to death?

Case: Roper v. Simmons

Yes. In saying this, I'm not indicating that I approve of this as a matter of policy. I just don't see anything in the Constitution prohibiting it. I can't see how what "cruel and unusual punishment" originally meant would have included this.

justices counted as agreeing with me: Scalia, Thomas
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

8. Is death by lethal injection a form of cruel and unusual punishment?

Case: Baze v. Rees

No. I don't agree with the Roberts/Kennedy/Alito plurality's standard for counting a punishment as cruel and unusual. They go with Supreme Court precedent instead of original meaning. Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment without agreeing with the reasoning of Roberts, Kennedy, and Breyer, and I'm with them on this. (Stevens accepted the plurality's reasoning as judging correctly by precedent as well, but he also thinks they got the original meaning wrong. In his case, though, he favored precedent over meaning, and he thought the original meaning would have favored the dissent's view. He just cared more about precedent than original meaning in this case.)

justices counted as agreeing with me: Roberts, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Souter, Ginsburg
justices who should count as agreeing with me: Scalia, Thomas

9. May a state sentence someone to death for raping a child?

Case: Kennedy v. Louisiana

Yes. I thought Kennedy's arguments for the negative were very good reasons against such a policy, but judges don't decide cases on whether laws are good policy. At least that's not how they should. The only legal arguments depended on the faulty decision in #7.

justices counted as agreeing with me: Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

10. Do suspected terrorists, who are not United States citizens, have any Constitutional rights?

Case: none that I know of. I do know of some cases that had to do with whether enemy combatants in the war on terrorism who aren't citizens have particular rights, such as the habeas corpus right to challenge their imprisonment. Every justice on the Supreme Court thinks people in that category have a right to life. If I were to murder them, I'd be held accountable. This is a terrible question, even worse than #5.

So technically, the answer is yes. But on the cases this question is probably supposed to be about, I think they would want me to answer no. But it says nothing about those cases, so I'm saying yes.

justices counted as agreeing with me: Well, I assume this was intended to refer to the actual war on terrorism cases like Hasul v. Bush, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, Boumedienne v. Bush. On those cases, I'm with Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito.
justices who count as disagreeing with me: Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
justics who should count as agreeing with me based on the question's actual wording: Roberts, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito

11. May the police search, without a warrant, a home when one owner consents to the search and the other objects?

Case: Georgia v. Randolph

Yes. I could have gone either way on whether it's a good policy, but I think Roberts' arguments that it will harm police ability to investigate domestic violence complaints are good enough reason to support it as a matter of policy. But I wouldn't want to rest my opinion of the case on policy matters. What matters is whether the Fourth Amendment would allow it. There I think Roberts' arguments are correct that you give up some privacy rights when you allow someone else to make decisions about when to allow others, including police, in your home by the act of sharing it with them. It's a bit arbitrary to say that if you're present you can object but if you're outside in the police car you can't (which is what the majority opinion said).

justices counted as agreeing with me: Roberts, Scalia, Thomas
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

12. May a state require that individuals present photo identification in order to vote?

Case: Crawford v. Marion County Election Board

Yes. There were actually three positions, but two agreed in the result. Stevens/Roberts/Kennedy thought it would violate equal protection to charge for an ID and then require the ID for voting, but Indiana doesn't charge for an ID. I guess the idea is that some people have a harder time paying than others, but I don't see how that can count as facial discrimination, so it shouldn't violate equal protection, as Scalia/Thomas/Alito argued. Souter/Ginsburg and Breyer offered dissents. Souter/Ginsburg thought it was an unreasonable and irrelevant burden on poor and old voters. Breyer thought this law was unconstitutional but did think Florida and Georgia voter ID laws were ok.

justices counted as agreeing with me: Roberts, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Souter, Ginsburg, probably Breyer (because he dissented)

[Technically Breyer would allow some voter ID laws, so he shouldn't be in that group on exactly this question, but I don't agree with his position or the Stevens/Roberts/Kennedy opinion.]

justices who should count as agreeing with me: Scalia, Thomas, Alito

13. May United States cities sue foreign countries to recover unpaid property taxes?

Case: Permanent Mission of India v. City of New York

Yes. I'm not highly familiar with the laws in question, but a brief look at the 7-2 majority's opinion makes it seem plausible enough that I'll defer to such a heavy majority. But I'm not especially confident about this. I should note that Ginsburg and Souter are often inclined to accept originalist or narrowly-construed readings of laws when no political hot button issue is at stake, which explains why they of the four liberals sided with the conservatives and Kennedy on this one.

justices who count as agreeing with me: Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito
justices who count as disagreeing with me: Stevens, Breyer

14. May a state execute a mentally-handicapped individual?

Case: Atkins v. Virginia

Yes. I disagree strongly with the punishment as a matter of policy, but to qualify as a cruel punishment, according to the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment, a punishment must inflict unnecessary pain deliberately, such as with methods of killing that seek to make it more painful. To qualify as unusual, it has to be fairly rarely used. 47% of states opposed this punishment at the time. That's not even a majority, never mind a consensus. The minority opinion is right to argue that the punishment is neither cruel nor unusual by Eighth Amendment standards, even if the policy preferences of the majority led them to seek to revise what the Constitution says to fit their own sense and what they saw as an increasing national sense of what's decent.

justices counted as agreeing with me: Scalia, Thomas
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

15. Do individuals have a Constitutionally protected right to possess firearms?

Case: District of Columbia v. Heller

Yes. There are certainly places where I disagree with gun-issue conservatives, even on constitutional implications, and some of them might be relevant to this case, but on this particular question I side with the majority opinion.

justices counted as agreeing with me: Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

16. Should a state be permitted to restrict how much money a politician may spend on his own campaign?

Cases: Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Committee    
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC

Yes, I guess. I'm of two minds about campaign finance laws as a policy issue, but this isn't supposed to be about policy preferences. I'm not as inclined as any of the Supreme Court justices to see campaign donations as speech protected by the First Amendment. (There have been campaign finance laws about issue ads, and those I do think count as free speech. But this isn't that issue.) They are material support for a candidate and are done because of one's support for that candidate, but they are not speech acts intended to communicate one's support. At least they're not that in themselves, even if someone wants to use them to communicate support. They're acts of material support, and I don't see how the First Amendment is relevant to that. The closest justices to that position in the Colorado case were Stevens and Ginsburg. They agree with an earlier dissent by Justice White that money in a campaign donation isn't always speech and isn't always used for speech. I'm not sure it's ever speech in itself, although the act of giving it might be intended to communicate. Does the First Amendment protect acts because they might ever be intended to communicate? Or does it protect acts that are clearly communication?

In the Nixon case, Stevens and Ginsburg both deferred to earlier precedent in going against their original view as to the result, but Stevens wrote a concurrence that said he didn't think money counts as speech. Property rights might protect it, but not the First Amendment. Ginsburg didn't join his opinion this time but didn't write at all to explain why. There was also a Fourteenth Amendment issue that I couldn't fully understand. I'm open to that, but I didn't see from what I did read how campaign finance laws violate equal protection with regard to freedom of association.

justices counted as agreeing with me: probably Stevens, maybe Ginsburg (I'm not sure how they're figuring the votes on this one) but they may well be counting Souter and Breyer too

justices counted as disagreeing with me: Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and maybe Souter and Breyer (with even Ginsburg possible, depending on which case they use)

17. May government officials search, without cause or without reason, individuals out on parole?

Case: Samson v. California

Maybe not, at least as worded. But yes if they mean what the majority in this case decided. I'm not entirely sure this question represents the case accurately. The majority opinion distinguishes between suspicionless searches and searches that are arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. A search can be suspicionless but still have a reason or cause (e.g. that the person is on parole and has violated it before is grounds for wondering if there will be repeat occurrences and wanting to search this particular parolee rather than another; that is a reason). But I know what they intend to convey. I'm not sure if the same justices would all support this in the general case, either. California law requires parolees to sign away their right not to be searched without suspicion when they agree to be released on parole. It's possible the same Court would have decided differently if that hadn't been present in this case.

justices agreeing with me: Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Roberts, Ginsburg, Alito
justices disagreeing with me: Stevens, Souter, Breyer

18. During school hours, should high school students enjoy the same freedom of speech rights as all other citizens?

Case: Morse v. Frederick

No. I'm not sure how I stand on the dispute between Alito/Kennedy and the other three majority justices or the dispute between Thomas and the other four majority justices. I do think the rights aren't the same for high school students, though, which means I'd disagree with the dissenting opinion by Stevens/Souter/Ginsburg and the concurrence in result by Breyer that still affirmed the result. Thomas has the most limited view of student speech rights. Alito and Kennedy have the most robust view of student rights among the majority justices. If I had to guess, I'd say I might lean toward the Alito/Kennedy view, but I could see myself being convinced of the Roberts/Scalia view also.

justices counted as agreeing with me: Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito
justices counted as disagreeing with me: Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg

I'm not sure where they would have classified Breyer, since he agreed with the result but not because of a difference in free speech rights. He just thought public school teachers have qualified immunity rights in such cases, and thus the principal in this case can't be held to have violated whatever speech rights the student had, even if those rights are present. I suspect he should count as saying Yes.

19. May school districts assign students to particular schools solely for the purpose of achieving racial integration?

Cases: Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1
Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education

Yes. I'll just link to my discussion of the 14th Amendment and Colorblindness, since my view takes some work to explain, and I've already done that.

20. Should the United States Supreme Court consider foreign law, including decisions by foreign courts or tribunals, when deciding cases?

I can't think of a particular case, although one use of foreign law already listed above (Roper v. Simmons) got a scathing rebuke from Scalia's dissent (joined by Rehnquist and Thomas). I've seen Roberts and Alito make similar comments, so I'm sure I'm with all four of the conservatives on the current Court on this issue, and I know the five others all have been willing to sign on to opinions that rest a lot on the use of foreign standards seen as ahead of us in a direction of progress, a position presented as important to catch up to. So the answer is No.

So I'd say:
justices I agree with: Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito
justices I disagree with: Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer

but since I don't know if they're referring to a specific case with this question, I don't know if they have exactly those justices in mind for the two sides of this question. They might have apportioned only those voting in Roper v. Simmons, for instance.

21.Should students be permitted to initiate and lead other students in a public prayer at a public school football game?

case: Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe

Yes. Allowing a forum for prayer, even allowing everyone to hear it, doesn't require anyone to participate and doesn't amount to government endorsement of the content. Even if the government endorsed the content, it wouldn't be tantamount to setting up a state religion, which is all the First Amendment prohibits.

justices I agree with: Scalia, Thomas
justices I disagree with: Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

22.Should pornography starring adult actors that are portrayed as minors be illegal?

case: Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition

Yes and no. I actually agree with O'Connor's concurrence/dissent. She thought the law in question prohibited too much and violated free speech protections when it comes to youthful-looking adults, although I think the Rehnquist/Scalia arguments that it's not clear that it does ring true; still, the law is unclear enough that it doesn't clearly prohibit too much, as Thomas' concurrence points out, and if any instances of prosecution occurred then those could be pursued and the case revisited, but since none had occurred there isn't a case to judge by. He thus advocated a narrow ruling, and I think that would have been wiser. O'Connor did, however, think the laws was perfectly fine and not to broad in prohibiting any images that clearly look like young children even if there was no actual young child involved in producing the picture. With today's technology, it really can be impossible to tell, and Thomas' resistance to that by pointing out that there haven't been cases yet displays an ignorance of the capability of programs like Photoshop. It happens already. It just hasn't been enforced and then defended on these grounds. In this case, I don't recommend the narrower ruling but recommend O'Connor's approach.

justices I agree with: none remaining on the Court, but I suppose I agree with Scalia in thinking some of them should be illegal and with Thomas more than the rest of the majority in thinking one category the law prohibits should be allowed.

justices I disagree with: all of them but in different respects, and I agree with a full half of Scalia and a full half of the majority (but for reasons more similar to Thomas'. So it "some but not all" or "yes in one category and not in the other" be a Yes or a No? I'm guessing the youthful-looking adult category is more dominant in the cases being discussed, o I'll side with the majority for the sake of the test and say No. But this reflects one of the problems with this test. It's not fine-tuned enough, and there's no answer that actually reflects my view once examining this case.

23. Should high schools be allowed to require drug testing before allowing any student to participate in extracurricular activities?

Case: Board of Education v. Earls

Yes. This decision was based on the precedent from Veronia School District v. Acton, and a look at book cases led me to conclude that it was a correct application of that precedent, even if it had to extend the reasoning to a more expansive kind of search. Justice Ginsburg was the only justice to agree with the earlier decision but not this one. On the original meaning issue, the question is whether this counts as a reasonable search if it's going to pass Fourth Amendment muster. I think it is reasonable to expect students who want to engage in voluntary special-privilege activities to be able to show that they can abide by drug laws.

justices I agree with: Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer
justices I disagree with: Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg

24. May a state enact a law that makes it a criminal offense for individuals to engage in homosexual intercourse?

case: Lawrence v. Texas
Yes, even though it's a dumb law. I especially like Thomas' dissent, which says  exactly that. I wrote about this case back in 2003, which you can find (with some format errors with apostrophes) here.

justices I agree with: Scalia, Thomas
justices I disagree with: Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

25. Should a state be allowed to place a Ten Commandments monument (similar to the one below) on the lawn of their State Capitol building?

case: Van Orden v. Perry

Yes. Paying tribute to ideas, including religious ideas, that have influenced the development of this country's traditions does not amount to setting up a state religion like the Church of England, which is what the establishment clause forbids. This is so whether it's in close proximity to secular symbols or not. It's also so regardless of whether its purpose is a deliberate attempt to promote monotheism or some other particular philosophical belief that might happen to be part of any number of religions, since promoting a philosophical belief that's a significant part of a widespread religion isn't the same thing as setting up that religion as a state religion like the Church of England.

justices I agree with: Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer (on this case, but on the very similar case decided at the same time where he joined the other liberals, I can't say I agree with his reasoning)

justices I disagree with: Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg


You scored 79% on Alito, higher than 79% of your peers.
You scored 77% on Scalia, higher than 89% of your peers.
You scored 74% on Thomas, higher than 82% of your peers.
You scored 80% on Roberts, higher than 86% of your peers.
You scored 68% on Kennedy, higher than 81% of your peers.
You scored 32% on Stevens, higher than 11% of your peers.
You scored 32% on Souter, higher than 16% of your peers.
You scored 33% on Breyer, higher than 9% of your peers.
You scored 33% on Ginsburg, higher than 16% of your peers

24 I said No but after rereading your post and considering how I think other laws do the same sort of thing (and is even the basis of why the States should've been the ones to decide on the legality of abortion or not) I may have to flip on that one.

This might affect my 5 which I said False.

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