Keith DeRose wonders about the resurgence of Calvinism in evangelicalism in the U.S. but the surprising dearth of Calvinists among contemporary analytic philosophers. I've long found this dichotomy a little strange., especially given the strong emphasis on theological determinism in the history of Christian philosophy. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Blaise Pascal, Nicolas Malebranche, G.W. Leibniz, and Jonathan Edwards were all much closer to Calvin and Luther than they were to the dominant libertarian views on freedom of today's Christian philosophers. For all of them, God's sovereign plan includes everything that happens, including the free choices of human beings.
I've always found it a little disturbing that very few Christian philosophers have been willing to tolerate Calvinism. It's almost an orthodoxy among Christian philosophers that libertarianism is true. I myself received a pretty damning condemnation of my denial of libertarian free will from Alvin Plantinga in personal conversation when I was an undergrad, enough that his whole demeanor and desire to continue talking with me changed drastically once I mentioned what my senior thesis was trying to argue. Most of the contributors and commenters at Prosblogion are very easily willing to call Calvinism intolerable, and Keith DeRose has used that exact term with me in online conversations. The main exceptions seem to be the Thomists, who don't accept Calvinism but at least don't treat it as beyond the pale, because they accept Aquinas' more semi-Pelagian streak that comes out in his biblical interpretation rather than his more determinist philosophy that comes out in his natural theology.
Keith quotes Dean Zimmerman, former faculty member at Syracuse where I am doing my Ph.D., to the effect that the main explanation for philosophers' abandonment of Calvinism is largely because philosophers have to deal more closely with nonbelievers in the secular academy, while theologians are more involved with in-house Christian circles due to teaching in seminaries. That means having to respond to the problem of evil, which many contemporary theistic philosophers think Calvinism cannot do adequately. While I think this is the correct explanation, I have two observations that make it seem a little stranger than it might otherwise seem. One is that Calvinism in one sense has a better response to the problem of evil, even if there's a sense in which it does not succeed as well (given a certain widely-accepted premise). The other is that contemporary philosophers have largely rejected libertarian views of freedom, and one might have expected Christians philosophers regularly rubbing shoulders with secular philosophers to be tempted to give the view up.
I've always thought Calvinism had far better resources to respond to the problem of evil on one important level. It's true that one common conception of what justice must require might conflict with what Calvinism teaches (but then we do tend to exaggerate our rights and God's obligations as fallen beings, and Calvinists have long argued that such a conception that labels the Calvinist God unjust relies on a fallen conception of justice and one contrary to what the scriptures teach). But it's also true that Calvinism offers a view of God's sovereignty according to which everything works out in the end in a way that is all according to God's original plan, with no surprise as in open theism and nothing beyond God's control as in any view in the Arminian/Wesleyan tradition.
Jon Kvanvig's recent Prosblogion posts have furthered the argument against open theism on this score, and many Calvinists have tried to make the same claim against any libertarian view (although I admit that such an argument is much harder to make). So while I admit that libertarian views have an easier time responding to one sort of problem of evil (again given a conception of justice that I find foreign to the scriptures), I think it's also true that non-Calvinist responses to the problem of evil accomplish much less than Calvinist philosophers have at least thought they could accomplish with more thoroughgoing views of God's sovereignty.
Another factor that surprises me about the state of contemporary theistic libertarian orthodoxy is that it's pretty much going against the grain of most philosophers today. Hardly anyone is a libertarian. Christian philosophers have held on to this view in the face of its widespread rejection by the majority of our contemporaries. I think that's a testament to these philosophers' willingness to allow philosophical reasoning to take precedence over social pressures. Peer pressure isn't leading to an acceptance of compatibilism. Of course, the same is true about dualism vs. materialism. Most philosophers are materialists. They see dualism as something we've left behind with the idea that whites are morally and intellectually inferior. Theistic philosophers have, by and large, been stalwart defenders of both libertarianism and dualism.
Because of this parallel, I can't say that the general abandonment of libertarianism is a good sign that Christians should abandon it, unless I also want to say the same of dualism, which I don't; I think the arguments against dualism are downright awful, and I don't want philosophers giving in to those weak arguments just because of peer pressure. But given that Christian philosophers are retaining libertarian views for the sake of philosophical respectability, it strikes me as a little funny that this is at the cost of holding a view that is becoming less philosophically respectable among the majority of secular philosophers. This isn't, of course, a reason to reject libertarianism (I think there are such reasons, and I'll be getting to them in due course in my Theories of Knowledge and Reality series, although I've presented them before also.) It's just an interesting sociological observation that a compatibilist Christian is going to view very differently from how libertarian Christians might view it.